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Abstract
Dual trading reduces the net order flow and market depth, but has
no effect on the expected total trading volume and price efficiency.
Trading volume and gross (of commission fees) profits of the informed
traders are lower with dual trading while trading volume and gross
losses of the uninformed traders are unaffected. The effect of dual
trading on the uninformed traders is the same irrespective of whether
they act as noise traders or as rational, risk-averse hedgers.
When the broker's commission income is independent of her
customer's trading volume, the competitive commission fee is lower with
dual trading. The utility of the uninformed traders (net of commission
fees) increases with dual trading while the net profits of the informed
traders decrease. If the commission income depends on the trading
volume, however, the competitive commission fee may increase with dual
trading. This is because the decrease in informed trading volume may
reduce the broker ' s expected commission income more than the amount of
her trading profits.

Dual trading refers to the practice of brokers trading for their
own accounts in addition to bringing their customers' orders to the
market. The practice has, over the years, been controversial with
proponents of dual trading vouching for its salutary effects on market
liquidity and price efficiency and opponents emphasizing the potential
conflicts of interest between dual trading brokers and their customers.
On the regulatory front, the anti-dual-trading camp currently holds
sway. In March 1993, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
proposed limiting dual trading in the largest futures markets. The
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) banned dual trading in all active
contracts effective May 20, 1991. But, the issue is by no means
settled, as the Exchange still faces great resentment over the ban.
I develop a model to study how a ban on dual trading will affect
aggregate market characteristics (market liquidity and price
efficiency) . I also study its distributional effects by looking at the
impact on brokers' commission fees as well as the trading volumes and
profits (both gross and net of commission costs) of the informed and the
uninformed traders. The main contribution of this paper lies in
highlighting the effect of dual trading on trading volume. In
particular, I show that the trading volume of the informed traders is
reduced because the broker mimics or piggybacks on the informed
trades.^ Because their orders are now executed at a higher (in
absolute value) price, ^ the broker's piggybacking makes it costly for
the informed traders to buy and sell the amounts they would have chosen
to trade in the absence of dual trading.
An important consequence of this result is that the competitive
commission fee charged by the broker could be higher with dual trading.
This is because the broker loses commission income due to the reduction
in informed trading •<'olume and this loss may more than offset her
trading profits. This possibility has not been pointed out in previous
studies of dual trading (for example, Fishman and Longstaff (1992)).
The effect of dual trading on market liquidity is mixed.
Liquidity is hurt because dual trading reduces the market depth. The
reason is that the broker, in addition to mimicking informed trades,
also offsets a portion of the uninformed order flow. The total effect
is to decrease the net order flow and increase the adverse selection
problem for the marketmaker (who is assumed to observe the net order
flow only) . Yet, the uninformed trading volume is a higher proportion
of the total expected trading volume with dual trading. In fact, the
total expected trading volume is not affected by dual trading as the
loss in informed trading volume is just made up by the broker's own
trading activity. Further, price informativeness does not change with
dual trading because market depth and the net order flow decrease in the
same proportion.
Initially, commission fees are ignored. The model is an extension
of Kyle (1985). Uninformed noise traders and a group of informed
traders submit market orders to a broker who places them (along with her
own orders) with a marketmaker for execution. The broker's motive for
dual trading comes from her private observations of the size of her
customers' orders.' In equilibrium, she is able to infer all of her
informed customers' information from her observations and profit through
mimicking or piggybacking on the informed trades. The marketmaker
batches the total order flow and executes them at a single price. The
price is determined by assuming that the marketmaker makes zero profits
conditional on observing the total order flow.
For the model with no commission fees, the main result is that the
profits of the informed traders are reduced with dual trading while
uninformed traders neither gain nor lose. This result does not change
when the model is extended to allow for rational behavior by uninformed
traders. Following Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), uninformed traders
(who are risk-averse) trade in order to hedge their endowments of shares
of the risky asset. The hedgers' trading volume and expected utility do
not change with dual trading. Although the broker still offsets a
portion of the hedgers' order flow, any impact of this on the hedgers'
utility is exactly made up by the reduction in market depth.
Next, I analyze trading behavior when traders have to pay
commission fees to the broker. As in Fishman and Longstaff (1992), the
broker incurs a fixed and a variable cost of brokerage. Further, the
brokerage business is competitive so that the broker's total income
(trading profits plus expected commission income) is zero. Two cases
are analyzed. In the first, the commission fees are assumed fixed
(i.e., independent of the order size) and are paid irrespective of
whether traders trade or not. This implies that traders never forego a
trade. Since the broker's commission income is independent of her
customers' trading volume, the competitive commission fee is always
lower with dual trading. The net profits of the informed traders
decrease and the net utility of the uninformed traders increase with
dual trading.^
The second case is an extended excunple based on Krishnan's (1992)
binomial version of Kyle (1985). In this example, the commission fee is
proportional to the amount traded. It illustrates that, when the
broker's commission income depends upon the trading volume, the
competitive commission fee may be higher with dual trading.
In related literature, Roell (1990) has a model of dual trading in
which a broker observes the trades of some uninformed traders. Her
model does not include the effect of commission fees. Informed traders
have higher profits when dual trading is banned. Uninformed traders
whose trades are observed by the broker have higher profits with dual
trading. Those whose trades are not observed by the broker are hurt by
dual trading.
In Fishman and Longstaff (1992), the broker has private
information about whether her customer is informed or uninformed.
Before commissions, all customers lose with dual trading- Including
commissions, dual trading benefits the uninformed traders and hurts the
informed traders. In contrast to this paper, these authors assume that
trading volume is fixed at one unit. As a result, the informed trader
in their model fails to take into account the broker's mimicking
behavior when formulating her optimal trading strategy. A further
implication of this assumption is that the broker's commission fees are
always lower with dual trading. They also do not model the behavior of
the customer when she is uninformed. On the other hand, they allow the
customer and the dual trader to trade at different prices and they also
model the effect of frontrunning by the broker.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I
develops the basic dual trading model with noise traders, ignoring
commission fees. In Section II, this is contrasted with a model where
dual trading is completely banned. Results on the market impact of dual
trading are obtained. Section III extends the model to allow for
rational behavior by uninformed traders. Section IV studies the effect
of dual trading on commission fees charged by the broker. Section V
concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
I . THE DUAL TRADING MODEL AND SOLUTION
A. The Dual Trading Model
I consider a market in which a single risky asset with unknown
liquidation value v is traded. There is a group of m informed traders
each of whom receive, prior to trading, signals s' about the unknown
value V. The signals are of the form s' = v + e', i=l,...,m where the
error terms e' are independent of each other. In addition, there is a
group of uninformed noise traders who trade for liquidity reasons.
Initially, the uninformed traders' motives for trading are not modelled.
Later, the basic model is extended to allow for rational behavior by the
uninformed traders.
Each informed trader i = 1,... ,m submits a market order x^ to a
d
broker. The noise traders also collectively submit market orders worth
u to the same broker. The latter then places the total of the submitted
m
orders (x^+u), where Xj = J^Xj, to a marketmaker for execution.^ In
i-l
the dual trading model, the broker may also trade an amount d for her
own account. She may want to do so because, by observing the market
orders x of the informed, she is able to infer some or all of their
d
6information s'. In addition, it may be profitable for the broker to
take the opposite position of the group of uninformed traders.' At
this stage, I ignore commission fees (which are introduced in
Section IV)
.
It is assumed that, when the broker places her customers' order
with the marketmaker, she simultaneously sends along her own order d as
well. The marketmaker then fixes a single price p^ at which she will
execute the total order flow y^ = x^ + d + u. Following Kyle (1985),
the marketmaker is assumed to be risk-neutral and competitive.
Conditional on observing y^, she earns zero expected profits.
The random variables in the model are v, u and e', i=l,..,m. All
these variables are normally distributed with zero mean and finite
variances Z^, E^^ and S^, respectively. Thus the m error terms are drawn
from an identical distribution. In addition, all investors follow
linear trading rules x = A^s', i=l,... ,m (for the informed) and
d = B.x, + BpU (for the broker). This implies that the marketmaker '
s
pricing rule is also linear: p^iv^) = ^^7^1 where 1/r^ is the
now-familiar market depth parameter.
There are three distinct stages to this trading gaune:
(1) Informed traders receive their information and decide how much
they want to trade. In making this decision, each informed trader is
aware that, first, she is in competition with the other informed traders
and, second, that the broker will "piggyback" on the information
conveyed by her trading decision. The informed traders care about the
broker's piggybacking because they receive a less favorable price for
their trades as a consequence. Noise traders simply submit u.
(2) The broker observes u and x^ and infers that each informed
d
trader has some information s' , i=l,...,m. Based on her inferences
and u, she decides to trade an amount d.
(3) The marketmaker fixes a price p^ = rj(x^+u+d) , where
Pd = E(v|y^) and so T^ = Cov( v,y^) /Var (y^) .
This suggests the following solution method. Fix r, and suppose
that each informed trader i=l,... ,m has decided to trade some amount x
d
and uninformed traders have submitted demand u. From each x the broker
d
infers information s' . She then chooses d to maximize her expected
profits, where the expectation is taken with respect to the vector
(s ,...,3'" ,u). Each informed trader i then chooses x as a best response
d
to d(s ,.. ,3"" ,u), the rival informed traders' decisions x , j * i. and
d
uninformed trades u. Finally, r^ is obtained from the optimal trading
rules and the marketmaker ' s zero profit assumption.
Depending upon what the equilibrium beliefs of the broker are,
there can be potentially many equilibria to the signalling game between
the informed traders and the broker. Fortunately, in this model, the
signalling game affords a unique solution: there is a single fully
separating equilibrium. In other words, she informed traders'
information is fully revealed to the broker and so in equilibrium
s^ = s', i=l,...,m.
B. The Dual Trading Solution
First, I solve the signalling game between the informed traders
and the broker. Given her observations of x and u, the broker
d
chooses d to maximize her conditional expected profits given by
E(7r|s^
, fS"" ,u), where n = (^-T^y^)*^- From the first-order condition,
the optimal d = [E ( v | s^*, ..., s""*) - T^(x^+\i) ] /2T^. The second-order
condition is satisfied by r^ > 0. Define t = ^^/(S^+Zg) and note that
0<t<l. tisa measure of the unconditional precision of s',
i=l,... ,m. For example, if t=l then s' is a perfect signal. Then
E(v|s''*,...,s'"*) = ts*/Q where Q = [l+t(m-l)] and s' = J^s^*. Therefore,
the broker's optimal trade is:
. _ ts* Xd+U
i-1
2QT,
(1)
In a separating equilibrium s' = s' = x,/A. for each i=l,...,m. So,
d °
the presence of the dual trader is seen to have two opposite effects on
an informed trader's incentive to trade. Suppose x. > (a buy order).
If x^ is increased, the broker infers that the informed traders'
information is improved and so s is higher as well. The broker trades
more, d is higher and so is the resulting price. Thus, this signalling
effect tends to inhibit informed traders from trading aggressively.
On the other hand, a higher x^ also reduces d from the second term
in (1). This is a "second-mover disadvantage" for the broker as she has
to accommodate market orders of any size by the informed and tends to
encourage informed trades. For finite m, however, the signalling effect
always dominates the second-mover effect, so that B^ > in equilibrium
(X. and d always have the same sign). The broker optimally mimics the
trading decisions of the informed. Also, the broker optimally takes the
opposite position of the aggregate uninformed trades.
Given (1), each informed trader i chooses x to maximize her
d
conditional expected profits E(I Is'), where
d
Id =
I
V - r^d - r^Xd - Fj J^ Xd^ " r^u x^. After incorporating the optimal
value of d from equation (1) into I , the first-order condition for x ,
d d
i * j is:
Equation (2) says that the marginal value of an additional trade
for the i-th informed trader is equal to its marginal cost. This cost
has two components: the change in the price due to her own and her
rivals' expected trades plus the change in the broker's inference as to
her information. After using the facts that (i) s' = s' = x /A^ in
equilibrium and (ii) E(3-'|s') = ts' for j * L, A. is obtained as the
coefficient of s' in (2):
A. = y^r^\ . (3)
^
rdO(Q-^i)
From (3), A. = when m = 1. But A. = cannot be a separating
equilibrium since the functions x = A.s', i=l,...,m are then no longer
invert ible.
Lemma 1: When m = 1, there is no solution to the dual trading model.
The result can be interpreted as follows. The inhibiting effect
of the broker's piggybacking or mimicking behavior on any individual
10
informed trader is inversely related to m, the number of informed
customers the broker has. For m = 1, this inhibiting effect exactly
offsets the marginal value of an extra trade for the individual informed
trader as the first-order condition (2) reduces to:
t(si-s^-) = r^xi. (4)
So, for any x > 0, the marginal cost of an additional trade for the
d
informed always exceeds its marginal benefits. Substituting (3) into
(1), the optimal dual trading function is given by;
d = ^^^— - ^. (5)
t(m-l) 2
Finally, by using (3) and (5) in conjunction with the marketmaker ' s zero
profit assumption the optimal value of market depth is derived as:
r, = 2 /^^^^_. (6)
(i+o/s;;
Proposition 1 fully characterizes the dual trading equilibrium.
Proposition 1: If m > 1 and t > 0, there exists an unique solution to
the dual trading model in which x = A^s', i=l,...,m, d = B^x^ - — and
Pj = r^j where A^ is given by (3), B^ by the coefficient of x^ in (5)
and r . by ( 6 ) .
11
II. THE MARKET IMPACT OF DUAL TRADING
In weighing the costs and benefits of dual trading, a regulator
might be interested in its effect on aggregate market characteristics
(total trading volume and profits, market depth and price efficiency) as
well as its distributional effect on individual groups of market
participants. These groups include the informed and uninformed traders
and the broker. The distributional impact of dual trading may be
discerned by considering its effects on the trading volumes of the
informed and the uninformed,^ the broker's commission fees and
traders' expected profits net of commission costs. The impact of dual
trading on aggregate market characteristics is studied in this section
and the distributional question is analyzed in the following two
sections
.
A, The Nondual Trading Model
I will compare the dual trading solution obtained in Section I
with the solution obtained when dual trading is completely banned. The
broker is then a pure intermediary, bringing her customers' orders to
the market.^ The resulting trading game is a Cournot-Nash game in
trading quantities. Each informed trader places an order x with the
n
broker based on her information s'. The broker submits the total order
flow y„ = x„ + u (where x„ is total informed trades in the nondual
trading market) to the marketmaker for execution. The price determined
is p^ = r^y^. Lemma 2 describes the nondual trading equilibrium.
12
Lemma 2: If there is no dual trading, a solution always exists provided
t > 0. The informed traders trade x = As' and the price is p = r_y ,
where:
Proof: See the proof of Lemma 1 in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).
B. Trading Volume and Gross Profits, Market
Depth and Price Efficiency
Due to piggybacking by the broker, it is reasonable to expect that
A^ < A^. The difference in informed trading intensities A-, i = d,n
depends upon the market depths r. and r^. By inspection of (6) and (7),
r^ = 2r^: relative to the market without dual trading, market depth is
half its value with dual trading. This reflects the fact that the dual
trading broker offsets half of the uninformed order flow. Given this
result, the difference in informed trading intensities:
A.-A,= j^ (3)
which is positive for t > 0. t/Q represents what the broker learns
about the unknown v from observing the m-vector of informed trades. The
more informative is this observation, the greater is the relative
shrinkage of the informed order flow in the dual trading market. The
difference (A^ - A^) is also positively related to market depth, since a
deeper market allows the broker to trade larger eunounts with less
concern about the price impact.
13
However, the broker herself provides an additional source of
trading activity in the dual trading market. Considering the dual
trading and informed trading activities together:
1 ts
_
_u
Td 1+0 2
X, .d=^^-^ (9)
_^ _ls_ (10)
r. 1*0
From (9) and (10), any difference in the net order flows between
the two markets occur because the broker offsets part of the noise
trading. As a result, total informed order flow (by the informed
traders and the broker) is halved due to the halving of market depth
and, further, the net noise trading order flow (of the broker plus the
noise traders) is halved. Hence, y^ = 2yj: the net order flow is twice
as high without dual trading.
The decrease in the net order flow occurs because the broker takes
the opposite position of the uninformed trades. Ignoring the effect on
informed trading activity, the trading volume is actually higher with
dual trading. Define the expected uninformed trading volume as
yEu/v/2ii. Then, the increase in the uninformed trading volume due to
dual trading is yS^/2v/27r. Define the expected net informed trading
volume in market i = d, n as Ai^mEg / /27t . Since A^^ < A^, informed
trading volume is lower with dual trading. In fact, it can be shown
that the two effects are exactly offsetting so that the expected total
trading volume is unaffected by dual trading.
14
So what can we conclude about the effect of dual trading on market
liquidity? The decrease in the depth parameter indicates an increase in
the adverse selection problem for the marketmaker . Yet, uninformed
trading volume is actually higher relative to the informed trading
volume when dual trading occurs. This is not reflected in the depth
parameter since the marketmaker is assumed to observe the order flow
after all trades are netted out. On the other hand, the result that
trading volume is constant implies that dual trading does not affect
liquidity.
Define price efficiency Pl^f i = d,n as S^ - var(v|pj). It can be
shown that PIj^ = (Fj^) ^Sy , where Sy is the variance of the net order
flow in market i = d,n. PIj depends positively on the volatility of the
net order flow (since this depends positively on the informed trading
intensities A^- ) and inversely on market depth (since prices are less
sensitive to volume, and hence to information, in deep markets) . It
follows that PIjj = PI^ because, relative to the nondual trading market,
the reduction in the variance of the net order flow is exactly offset by
the reduction in market depth in the dual trading regime.
Let I- denote the combined unconditional expected profits of the
informed group (before observing any signals or paying any commissions)
in the i-th market, i = d,n. Since the price level p,- = T-y-, it is the
same in the two markets. It follows that I^ < I^: gross profits of the
informed are strictly lower with dual trading (since the price level is
the same but the informed order flow is lower) . Total trading profits
in the dual trading market is I^ + W, where W is the broker's
unconditional expected trading profits. Total informed trading profits
15
in the dual trading market ( I^ plus that part of the broker's profits .
obtained from mimicking informed trades) is half of I^ (since the price
level is the same but total informed order flow is half of x^) . But,
the broker also profits from her observance of noise trading and the
amount of this profit equals r^Z^/4 or r^ll^^/2, which is exactly half of
I„. Thus I . + W = I„.
n an
In equilibrium, the uninformed traders as a group suffer losses
and the amount of their losses mirrors the total trading profits of the
informed traders and the broker. Denote L„ = I . - I„ + W as the
g d n
difference in the gross losses of the uninformed traders between the
dual and nondual trading regimes. Therefore, L = 0.
Proposition 2: (1) y^, = 2yj and r^ = 2r^. The net order flow and market
depth in the dual trading market are half their values in the nondual
trading market. (2) The expected total trading volume, the gross
trading profits and price efficiency are the same with or without dual
trading. (3) In "^ ^r, ^^^ ^q = ^ • Gross profits of the informed are
lower with dual trading. Gross losses of the uninformed are unchanged.
In the following section, the basic model is extended to allow for
rational behavior by the uninformed traders.
III. HEDGING BY UNINFORMED TRADERS
There are h risk-averse uninformed traders ("hedgers") who trade
for purely risk-sharing reasons. The development of the model here
follows Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). Each hedger j has random
endowment w-" , which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance S^. w^
, j = l,...,h are independent of each other and all
16
other random variables in the model. All hedgers have negative
exponential utility functions with risk-aversion parameter R.
Suppose that in market i all hedgers j = l,...,h submit market orders
u to the broker and follow linear trading rules of the form u = D-wJ.
1 i '
h
Let the total uninformed trading volume in market i be Uj^ = 52 u^ . If n.
is the profit of the j-th hedger in the i-th market, then u. is chosen
to maximize her utility or certainty-equivalent profits G. = E(7r.|w-') -
— Var (TT.
I
w-" ) . Let G-, i = d,n be the sum of the utilities of all
h hedgers in the i-th market. The informed traders and the broker's
maximization problem remains the same as before, since each w^ is
independent of v.^^ Market depth is now positively related to the
magnitude of the "hedge factor" Dj (since this increases the variance of
the total order flow) and to the risk aversion parameter R. Further,
the equilibrium Dj < since the marginal utility of the hedgers from a
purchase (sale) is negative if endowments are positive (negative).
Lemma 3 describes the equilibrium for the nondual trading market. The
appendix describes the dual trading equilibrium.
17
Lemma 3: An equilibrium to the hedger model exists if R satisfies:
RS^(2-t) > 2^/mtL^ / ,Jh^. (^1)
In equilibrium, each hedger j=l,... ,h trades u = D^w-* , where D^ < 0,
market depth is l/I^,,/ and:
-DT = ^^^^"^ (12)1 n I——
—
where
2ymtE^/hS„ - RS^(2-t)
"
^
~^r,—
;
—
Ri:..mt • (1^)
RS„(2-t)
h(l+0)
Proof: See the proof of Proposition 1 in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam
(1992).
(11) states that equilibrium exists if the amount of risk-aversion
and noise in the market exceeds the amount of information available.
From (12) and (A13) in the appendix, r^ab(D^) = 2r^ab(D^), where ab(D-)
denotes the absolute value of Dj. How does dual trading affect the
choice of D-? The price impact of liquidity order flows is given by
r-Uj . Conjecture that r. = 2r . Then, since the net liquidity order
flow are halved with dual trading, the price impact of liquidity trades
(including those by the broker) is identical in both markets and so
D. = D„. This in turn means that u . = u„ and the initial conjecture
n an -'
regarding the market depths must be correct as well.^^ As before, the
18
price levels are identical in the two markets and, so by implication,
Gj = G^. Hence, the results about the market impact of dual trading
reached in the previous section is robust to the introduction of
rational uninformed traders.
Proposition 3: D^^ = D^/ G^ = G^ and r^ = 2r^. The hedgers' trading
volumes and gross utilities are the same with or without dual trading.
The depth of the market is halved when dual trading is permitted.
IV. TRADING WITH COMMISSION FEES
Suppose that, in market i, the broker charges a commission fee of
$c^- to cover her costs of brokerage. Agents make their decisions in the
following sequence. At stage zero, the broker determines the commission
fee C-. At stage one, the informed traders observe their signal
realizations and c^ . Uninformed traders observe their endowment
realizations and c-. Then, both groups of traders decide how much to
trade. At stage two, if dual trading is allowed, the broker's trade
size is also contingent on c^ and her observance of informed and
uninformed trades (if any). Finally, a price is set in the manner
specified earlier.
The broker faces a fixed cost kg and a variable cost k^ of
conducting business, both costs being non-negative. Following Fishman
and Longstaff (1992), I assume that the brokerage business is
competitive and so the commission fee c,- is chosen so that the broker's
expected trading profits plus expected commission income equals zero.
In Section A, I will assume that there is a fixed commission fee
per trade and it has to be paid irrespective of whether traders make a
19
trade or not. Here, the commission may be interpreted as a market
access fee. The variable cost k^ is also incurred on a per trade basis.
In this case, the commission does not affect traders' decisions
regarding how much and whether to trade. Thus, the number of trades
that occur in equilibrium is the same as the total number of traders in
the market. Since the broker's commission income does not change, the
competitive commission fee is always lower with dual trading.
In Section B, I construct an example illustrating that when the
broker's commission income depends upon the trading volume, the
competitive commission fee may be higher with dual trading because of
the negative effect on the informed trading volume. In this example,
the commission fee is proportional to the order size and has to be paid
only when a trader buys or sells a share of the asset. With dual
trading, informed traders reduce their order size due to the broker's
mimicking behavior. This reduction in the broker's expected commission
income more than offsets her expected trading profits.
A. The Effect of Dual Trading on the Commission When It Has to
Be Paid Irrespective of Whether Traders Trade or Not
When the j-th informed trader trades, her net profits in market i
are N. = I. - c.. If she does not trade, her losses are -c, . So, she
1 1 '
1
will always trade. Also, her equilibrium order size and gross profits
will not change since the first-order conditions for her trading
decision are not affected. Similar remarks apply to the uninformed
traders. Thus, the total number of traders (m+h) is also the number of
trades occurring in equilibrium. The commission fees are determined by
the following equations:
20
c, -k, »i^ (14)
c„=k, *J\. (15)
" ^ m+h
(14) and (15) equate the profit margin per trade (c--k^) in
market i to the fixed cost of brokerage per trade, net of the broker's
profits. Since the broker's dual trading profits are positive, c. < c .
Further, the difference in commission fees (Cri~^d^ ^^ equa.1 to the dual
trading profits per trade. For the j-th uninformed trader, her net
profits are n - c . in the dual trading market and tt - c in the nondual
market. From Proposition 3, her gross profits (and utility) are
unchanged with dual trading. Since c^ < c^, her net profits (and
utility) increase with dual trading. For the informed traders.
Proposition 2 says that their gross profits decrease by W, the amount of
dual trading profits. The value of the reduction in commission fees to
them is —5L_W. Thus, the net profits of informed traders decrease with
m-t-h
dual trading.
Proposition 4: Suppose that in market i, traders pay a fixed commission
fee of c- irrespective of whether they trade. Then (1) c^ < c^ and
(2) net of C-, the utility of the uninformed traders are higher and the
profits of the informed traders are lower with dual trading.
B. An Example to Show That the Competitive Commission
Fee May Be Higher With Dual Trading
This section develops a binomial version of the Kyle model based
on Krishnan (1992). The value of the risky asset v can take on one of
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two values or 1, each with probability one-half. UninformecJ traders
are modeled as noise traders, as in the basic model. There is a single
informed trader with perfect information about the asset value. Her
trading strategy is X(v). Denoting x as a realization of X(v), I assume
that X is an element of the set S = {-1, -.5, +.5, +1}. The net order
flow y is the sum of x and the noise trades and also takes on values in
the set S. There is a broker who charges a proportional commission fee
of $Cj per share in market i.
Consider the nondual trading market first. The marketmaker '
s
pricing rule is P(y_,). She sets a price p that earns her zero expected
profits after observing y^. Thus, if y^^ takes on the value z in the
set S, then the price p is set according to the following rule:
P = E(v|y„=z) = ,^-^^"^^1"^^^
,
(16)
P,(yn=z|v=l) + P,(y„=z|v=0)
where P^(A) stands for the probability of event A occurring. Because of
noise trading, x and y need not be the same. The marketmaker uses her
observation of y^ to make an inference about x and, therefore, v. This
inference process is assumed to take the following form:
Assumption Al: Pj.(y^=z |x( v) =z)=r^ and P^(y^i'z | X( v)=z) = ( 1-r^ ) /3=q^ , where
Assumption Al states that the informed order flow and the net
order flow are positively correlated. In equilibrium, informed
traders maximize profits and the marketmaker makes zero profits
conditional on the order flow realized. Two observations are in order.
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First, in this example, the equilibrium prices belong to the open unit
interval (0, 1). This implies that if v = 0(1) the informed trader will
optimally sell (buy). Second, given Assumption Al, P(l) = P(0.5) and so
the profits of the informed trader are strictly proportional to the
order size. Thus, informed traders find it profitable to buy (sell)
one share rather than half a share if v = 1(0).
For trading to be profitable, trading revenues must exceed the
commission costs. This requires the following condition to be
satisfied:
^^i3l
.q^ > c„. (17)
^i^Qi
Lemma 4: Assume that Al holds. If (17) is satisfied, trading occurs in
equilibrium and the optimal trading strategy of the informed trader is
to buy 1 share if v = 1 and to sell 1 share if v = 0. The equilibrium
prices are P(l) = r,/(r^+q,) and P(-l) = q,/(r^+q^).
Next, consider the dual trading market. I assume that the
informed trader's market orders belong to the set S, as before, but the
broker's trades are restricted to the set {-0.25, +0.25}.^® The
combined order flows of the informed trader and the dual trader then
belong to the set T, where T = {-1.25, -0.75, -0.25, +0.25, +0.75,
+1.25}. The net order flow y^ (including noise trading) is also a
realization from the set T. The marketmaker ' s inference process is
captured by the following assumption:
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Assumption A2: P^(y^=z | X( v)=z ) =r^ if z = 0.25 or 0.75 and
P^(y^=1.25|x(v)=1.25)=r2, where r^ > r^ . P^(y^*z | X(v)=z) = ( 1-r^ ) /5= ( 0. 6)q,
if z = 0.25 or 0.75; Pj,(y^5tl . 25 | X( v) =1 . 25)=q2, where r^ > q^.
The idea behind Assumption A2 is that the largest sized order is
more likely to come from an informed trader than a small or medium-sized
order. The practical effect of the assumption is that, in the proposed
equilibrium, P(1.25) > P(0.75) = P(0.25). Suppose the dual trader buys
0.25 shares whenever she observes a positive informed order flow. Then
the informed trader may prefer to buy half a share (in which case
y^ = 0.75 with high probability) instead of one share (when y^ = 1.25
with high probability) if the additional cost of buying an extra half
share exceeds the marginal revenue. This is precisely the piggybacking
effect discussed in the more general model of Sections I and II. The
following lemma states the conditions under which the dual trading
equilibrium exhibits the piggybacking effect.
Lemma 5: In the dual trading equilibrium, trading occurs if:
l-2j:iqi
„ 1 2q, > c^. (18)(0.6)q,+ri ^^ '^
If the informed trader buys (sells) the dual trader believes that
V = 1(0) and she buys (sells) 1/4 of a share. Suppose the following
condition also holds:
2^,- ,0.6)q. . i^il - 5;''';^"^' <^. (19)
^
^ Qa-'l^a (0.6)qj+ri 2
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Then, the informed trader buys (sells) 1/2 of a share if v = 1(0). The
equilibrium prices are P(0.75) and P(-0.75).
The commission fees are set competitively. The variable cost k.
is computed on a per share basis. In deriving the competitive fees, I
assume that (17), (18) and (19) hold and so trading occurs in
equilibrium at the levels described in Lemmas 4 and 5. Of course, these
three conditions themselves depend upon the fees. Later, I provide a
numerical example where the fees are set as described below and (17),
(18) and (19) are also satisfied.
In the nondual trading market, c is determined by the following
equation:
(i.*f)«:„-k.) =k.. '20)
r^ + q^/2 is the expected trading volume in the nondual trading market.
This expression is derived in the following way. With probability
one-half, v = 1 and the informed trader buys one share. With
probability r^, the order flow is 1 and with probability q^ , the order
flow is 1/2. A similar calculation holds good on the sell side.
For the dual trading market, I calculate the broker's customer
trading volume by computing the expected total trading volume in the way
described above and then subtracting off 1/4 of a share, which is the
broker's expected trading volume. Then, c^ is given by the following
expression:
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0.5(1.5r^ + l.Sqj - 0.5) (c^ - kj = k^ - W (21)
where W is given by:
0-6q,
W = --^— (ri + 0.3qi
ri + 0.6qi 1
^
(22)
From Assumption A2
, q^ < 0.15 and the broker's expected customer trading
volume is lower with dual trading. This creates the possibility that
the loss in the broker's expected commission income will more than
offset her expected trading profits. Proposition 5 relates when this
happens
.
Proposition 5: Suppose (17), (18) and (19) are satisfied. c^ > c^ if:
, l>r,-1.6q,
I ^^ (23)
Comparing (22) and (23), higher values of r^ and kg make c^ > c^ more
likely. Higher values of r^ is analogous to increase the trading
intensity of the informed traders in the more general model, enhancing
the "bite" of the piggybacking effect. A numerical example satisfying
Proposition 5 is provided below.
A Ntimerical Example of Proposition 5. Suppose r^ = 0.81, q^ = 0.063,
rg = 0.86, qj = 0.028, kg = 0.08 and k^ = 0.043 (4.3 cents per share).
The competitive commission fees are c = 13.81 cents per share and
c^ = 14.64 cents per share. In the nondual trading market, the expected
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gross profits of the informed traders are 18 cents per share in
ecjuilibrium; in the dual trading market it is 14.86 cents per share.
Thus, trading always occurs in equilibrium. The piggybacking effect
exists because, with dual trading, if the informed trader is trading 1/2
of a share, there is a loss of 3.7 cents per share from trading another
1/2 of a share. The net profits of the informed traders fall from
4.28 cents per share to 0.22 cents per share with dual trading. The
losses of the uninformed traders also decrease by 3.4 per share with
dual trading.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper considers the effects of allowing brokers to trade on
their own account (to dual trade) in addition to their usual
intermediary function. In the model without commission fees, dual
trading leads to a reduction in the net order flow and the market depth,
but expected trading volume and price efficiency is not affected.
Informed traders have lower profits with dual trading because they are
forced to be less aggressive in anticipation of the broker mimicking
their trades and piggybacking on their information. The broker also
takes the opposite position of uninformed trades and offsets a portion
of the uninformed order flow. Since the net uninformed order flow and
the market depth both decrease by the same proportion, however, the
price impact of an uninformed trade and the variance of uninformed
profits are unchanged. So, uninformed traders neither gain nor lose
with dual trading.
The effect of dual trading on the commission fee charged by the
broker depends upon whether the broker's commission income is
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independent of the trading volume. Two cases are analyzed. In the
first, commission fees are fixed and have to be paid irrespective of
whether traders choose to trade or not. Here, the competitive
commission is lower and, net of the commission, informed traders have
lower profits and uninformed traders have higher utility with dual
trading.
The second case involves a binomial version of Kyle (1985) where
the commission fee is proportional to the amount traded. The example
illustrates that the competitive commission fee may be higher with dual
trading if the loss in the broker's expected commission income due to
the reduction in the informed trading volume is greater than her trading
profits.
H-AS. 13-43
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FOOTNOTES
^See The Chicago Tribune , February 4, 1992 and The Wall Street
Journal , February 7, 1992 for details.
^Chang and Locke (1992) find no positive correlation between the
order imbalances of dual traders and customers in the current futures
market. They conclude that piggybacking behavior by dual traders is
absent. However, since no distinction is made between informed and
uninformed customer trades, the lack of a positive correlation is not
conclusive.
^This effect is partially due to the fact that traders transact in
a batch market where the price is increasing in the net order flow, as
in Kyle (1985). This characteristic of the model maximizes the negative
impact of piggybacking on informed trading. But the effect would remain
in a multiperiod setting where the orders of the customers and the
broker are executed and priced separately, so long as some subset of the
informed customers make repeat purchases or sales via the same broker.
From Kyle (1985), the optimal dynamic trading strategy of an informed
trader is to dribble her trades over time.
^Empirical studies of the effect of dual trading on market depth
and the bid-ask spread have produced mixed results. Many of the studies
(Chang and Locke (1992), Park and Sarkar (1992) and CFTC (1990)) find
that, in the markets studied so far, dual trading does not significantly
affect liquidity as measured either by the bid-ask spread or the depth.
Smith and Whaley (1990), however, show a significant increase in the
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effective bid-ask spread as a result of a restriction on dual trading.
Walsh and Dinehart (1991) also find some evidence that dual trading is
associated with narrower bid-ask spreads.
The broker is assumed to have no private information of her own.
For a model with a privately informed broker, see Sarkar (1991).
"Specifically, the price impact of the hedgers' trades is given by
the product of the net uninformed order flow and the inverse of the
market depth. Both the net uninformed order flow and the market depth
are halved. Hence the result.
The results when the broker's commission income is independent of
the trading volume is consistent with Fishman and Longstaff (1992) where
the trading volume is fixed at one share.
®I will adopt the convention of labelling the decision variables of
individual agents with a superscript and market variables with a
subscript. The subscript d will refer to the solution in the dual
trading model and the subscript n to the nondual trading solution.
The broker is assumed to have no independent information
regarding v. In a previous version of this paper (Sarkar (1991)), the
broker has her own information but does not observe uninformed trades u.
Also m = 1. This makes for some interesting interactions between the
information of the single insider and that of the broker. For example,
for low precision of the broker's information, the insider's trades is
actually decreasing in the precision of her own information!
'"For m = 2, I have checked that the results are unchanged if the
informed traders have information of different precisions. I conjecture
that this is true for general m.
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In Sarkar (1991), an equilibrium exists even with m = 1 so long
as the precision of the broker's information is positive. The reason is
that, if the broker has an independent source of information about v,
she attaches relatively less weight to her observation of the informed
trade. The change in the broker's inference, when the informed trader
buys or sells an extra share, no longer fully offsets the marginal value
of that extra share traded.
Since, in the model so far, the trading volume of the uninformed
is not a choice variable, the impact of dual trading on uninformed
trading volume will not be considered until Section III (when I do model
the uninformed trading decision).
'some brokers can commit not to dual trade (as occurs in reality).
Those customers who value the superior trading skills of dual trading
brokers (as suggested in Grossman (1989)) will continue to patronize
them. Others, perhaps more concerned with frontrunning and other
potential abuses, may choose the brokers committed not to dual trade.
Thus, my model should be seen as a reduced form of this more general
situation where traders and brokers are matched according to their
varying needs.
^'^Of course, the actual informed and dual trading volumes will be
different since market depth will be different, in general.
^^Note that this is precisely the situation considered in the
previous section, where u was exogenous ly fixed at the same level in the
two markets. The appendix proves this result formally.
^^The assumption is stricter than it needs to be. For excimple.
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when y and X(v) are not equal, the probabilities could vary with the
realized value of y.
See the proof of Lemma 4 in the appendix.
Thxs assumption can also be relaxed. It is motivated by the
desire to make the point of this example as simply as possible.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
m
,
1 • _m''Let E(v s' ,...,3*") = as , where s* = > s^*. Applying Bayes'
=s="
'"'^^'
" ' 1/zl *'m/S, ' lHm-l)f ""^"^^ ' = VIV^:,)- This gives the
Optimal dual trade d(s ,x.) as given in (1).
Incorporating (1), each informed trader i's profits I can be
d
written as:
^" "^ lMm-l)t 2 2""^ 2 n
Substituting s^' = s^ = —^ for each i = l,...,m into (Al)
E:(idMsi) = [t- - ^^7r ^ ^ M^" 2 r^ l+dn-Dc aJ
.y. E(xils^)/ ^ t 1 V vi
3^1 2 t ^ iMm-Dt aJJ -«-d
(A2)
Substituting E(x | s' ) = A^^ts' for each j * i into (A2) and then
differentiating with respect to x gives (2). When m = 1, (2) has the
d
form:
^dl^+l'dl = ts^ . (A3)4^*^^)
It is easily checked that there is no A^ > such that x = A^s' has a
solution.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Xd[l+t(m-l)] uFrom ( 3 ) and ( 5 ) , y^ = x^ + d + u =
^^^_j^^ ^ -^ , or
:
'^- t2>t"-l,l -^ > f-
Where s.g si
(6) follows from solving T. = covariance (v,y.) /variance (y^) .
-
Proof of Proposition 2
Price informativeness PIj,i = d,n is defined as:
Pli = S^ - Variance (v|p.) = llSy^. (A5)
Since r^ = 2r^ but y^ = ^, PI^ = PI^.
I- = E([v-pj]x-) is the total unconditional expected profits of
the informed traders in market i = d,n.
^d *^ ^n s^^^® Pd ~ Pn ^'^*^
a n
Id + W = E( [v-pj [xj+d])
(A6)
V ,, I T I' l;
E [v-pj ^n _ U
2 2
I r s
,1 •n \/mtSvSuThe result follows because r„S,, = -i — = I_
,
The expected trading volume in the nondual trading market is
-^ + -^—-
. The expected trading volume in the dual trading market
is —— ^ + ^—- . Substituting in for the values of Aj and A„, we0-1 y2¥ 2 y2¥ d n'/2Ti
get the result that the expected trading volumes are the same.
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Proof of Proposition 3
In the dual trading market, the profits of the j-th hedger is;
71^ = v(Ud^ +wi) - r^uiiu^ +Dd5;w»+Xd + dj, (A7)
ts ^dSince X^ + d = „ ,_—^^^ - -r- , this expression becomes;
^ ^ r.(i+o) 2
71^ = v(Ud +W^) TdUi H^^5-i-i%-^ (A8)
E{7i^|w^)
-^(Ud^)^ (A9)
Vaz{ni\wi) = S^(w3)2 + ^^i) SJ 1 - mt (2-^Q) \
(1+0)2 j
. J^(h-i)E. + 2S„wiuH' -I2jl|l1+Q
(AlO)
The certainty-equivalent profits G^ =E{jt^|w^) - — Var(7i^|w^)
Differentiating G,j with respect to u^-' :
i
_ n,, J
-r^Ud' - Rui 2 fi, mt(2.Q) ] , iId£d)!(h-l)S
'' 1+Q 0.
(All)
Equating D^ to the coefficient of w-" in (All) and solving:
RD^iI^(h-l)S„.D,
^ n (1-0)2 j.
+
RS^(2-t)
^
^
(A12)
1-Q
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Solving for r^^:
(1+0) JhS^
From (12) and (A13), r^D^ = 2r^D|^. Solving for D^ shows D^ = D^.
It follows that G^ = G"* for each j. Thus G. = G„. Finally, D. = D„nd an •''dn
implies that r. = 2r
n
Proof of Proposition 4
From (14) and (15), c„ - c^ = -. The total benefit to all of the
m + n
broker's customers is (m+h) (c -c
.) = W. The share of the m informed
traders in the pie is —5L^W < W, which is their loss from dual trading.
m + h
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose the equilibrium is as given in Lemma 4. Then, X(l) = 1
and X(0) = -1. The informed trader's expected profits from buying one
share is:
N„(l) =rJl-P(l)] + q,[3 -P(l/2) -P(-l/2) -P(-l)] - c„ (A14)
where P(l) = ^^^yn = ^\-=^) ^ ._ _1^ ^^^s)
P, (y„ = l|v = l) + P,(y„ = l|v=0) Xi+q,
P(-l)=— ^^^-^1";^^ . r=^^ (A16)P,(y„ = -l|v = l) + P, (y„ = -liv=0) q, +r,
and P(l/2) = P(-l/2) = 1/2.
Rewriting (A14) after substituting in for the equilibrium prices:
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N„(l) =q, . ^^ -c„. (A17)
Suppose instead the informed trader's strategy is X(l) = 1/2 and
X(0) = -1/2. (We confine ourselves to symmetric strategies of the form
X(l) = +Z and X(0) = -Z.) Then, it is easily checked that
N^(l) = 2Nj^(l/2). Note also that the informed trader will never sell
when V = 1 because her net profits are always negative. A similar proof
obtains on the sell side and so is not repeated here.
Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose the dual trader observes x > 0. She infers that v = 1.
Given that p e (0,1), it is optimal for her to buy 1/4 of a share.
Similarly, if x < it is optimal for her to sell 1/4 of a share.
Next, consider the informed trader's problem. Suppose X(l) = 1/2
and X(0) = -1/2. She knows that the broker will buy and sell 1/4 of a
share. If v = 1 and she buys 1/2 of a share, x+d = 3/4 and her expected
profits are:
Nd(l/2) = ll[l-P(3/4)] + "'^"^^ [5 -P(-3/4) -P(5/4) -P(l/4)
(A18)
P(-l/4) -P(-5/4)] - -^
where P(3/4) = -^-— (A19)
Xi + O.Sqi
0.6a,
P(-3/4) =
^ ^
^^ (A20)
0.6qj +ri
and P(5/4) =P(-5/4) =P(l/4) =P(-l/4) =1/2.
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Substituting in for the equilibrium prices:
Suppose that the informed trader decided to buy and sell 1 share
instead. Proceeding the same way as before, her expected profits are:
N,(l) = 2q2 ^ ^^^ - c,. (A22)
It is optimal for her to buy 1/2 of a share instead of one share if
[Nj(l) - Nj(l/2)] < 0, which is (19) in the text. Trading occurs in
equilibrium if li^{l/2) > 0, which is (18) in the text. Again, we can
repeat this exercise on the sell side.
Proof of Proposition 5
The expected trading volume in the nondual trading market is
E(|y„|) = 2 --i- •( r^ »•
-y^ = r^ + -y^ . In the dual trading market, the
expected total trading volume is E(|yd|) = r^— +0.6q^|— +— j. The
expected customer trading volume for the broker is E(|y|j| - E(|d|) =
0.75r^ + 0.9q^ - 0.25. The competitive commission fee Cj in market
i = d,n solves the equation:
cjEdyJ) -E(|d|)] + W = kjEdyJ) -E(|d|)] + ko. {A23)
Of course, in the nondual market d = and W = 0. (20) and (21) in the
text follow from (A23). The broker's expected trading profits are:
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W = — [W(l/4) + W(-l/4)
]
^ (1 -P(3/4) ^P(-3/4)) + 2.:l3l (5 -P(-3/4) +P(3/4) )
4 4
= W(l/4)
where W(l/4) is the expression derived in (22) of the text,
From (20) and (21):
Cd - c„
ko-W
0.75ri+0.9qi-0.25 ij+CSq^
(A24)
Simplifying, we obtain (23) in the text,
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